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【序言】爱股网投资文摘收录50多名国内知名价值投资博客的文章，从而为广大用户提供最新、最有价值的投资文摘。在这里你可以领略投资高手们的投资理念，关注他们的投资组合，了解他们的选股思路以及他们对个股和行业的看法。
—————————————————————————————————————————————2011-03-13 09:53:50 新浪博客 夕饮冰
Learning Curve学习曲线
（夕注；这个投资智慧系列里的语言虽然简练，但我相信都是成功投资者刻骨铭心的产物。这里的每一句都值得反复地玩味。比如有关DCF估值方法的使用，国内有些名人也在推崇，但你看看国外其他成功投资人对此方法的见解，你可能就不会花费很多的精力去研究它了。
我不敢仅仅转译成中文而保留了英文原文的对比，因为我担心自己对投资理解得不深悟得不够而误了他人。）
Becoming a better investor has always struck me as
a process of self-education – you read everything you can and learn
through trial and error. My finance degree, except for having to
take some accounting courses, was worthless.
Aaron Edelheit, 1.31.08
要成为一个合格的投资者，我认为最重要的是自我教育的过程——你要读你能读的所有的东西，并从实践和错误中学习。我的金融学位，除了一些会计课程外，其它的都是垃圾。
I’ve had the good fortune of being around smart
investors my whole life, including my father. But I’d have to say
learning from what works and what doesn’t is how you really become
a better investor. In the end, the market is the best teacher.
Wayne Cooperman, 3.30.07
我很幸运，在我的生命中遇到了很多聪明的投资人，这包括我的父亲。但我必须说，从什么是有用的，什么是没用的东西中学习，才能让你真正地变成一个优秀的投资者。最终，市场是最好的老师。
I generally find the best investors are very open
and have almost a child-like curiosity
about how everything works. They don’t come to the
table with preconceived notions. Americans, in fact, are more
likely to have this kind of attitude than Europeans or
Asians. It’s much harder to learn new things when
you think you already know everything.
Oliver Kratz, 6.29.07
我总是发现，最优秀的投资者的思想都非常开放，几乎都对事物如何运行保有一颗孩童般的好奇心。他们不会带着已经成型的思想来到桌边。事实上，美国人比欧洲人和亚洲人更可能有这样的态度。如果你认为你什么都知道了，那就很难学习新的东西了。
If you stop learning, the world rushes right by
you. It's very hard to do this by merely hearing someone else talk.
That's why most teaching is vivid. For example, when they trained
soldiers for World War II, they shot real bullets above them, which
really taught them to hug the ground.
Charlie Munger, 7.31.07
如果停止了学习，这个世界就会倏忽间离你而去。仅仅听其它人说话，就很难做到这点。这就是为什么大多的教育是生动的。例如，当他们为二战训练战士时，他们会向他们上方射出真正的子弹，这真正地教会他们去紧紧地拥抱大地。
Around 1982 it hit me that there were a lot of
lousy stocks in my portfolio and I started wondering why. While it
sounds like an obvious conclusion now, the common
denominator of the losers was that
they were in lousy businesses. I realized I should be more of a
business analyst than a stock analyst, meaning that I had to
better
understand how companies themselves created value.
I moved more away from classical stock metrics of P/E and book
value to business metrics of return on capital and cash
flows.
Andrew Pilara, 4.30.07
1982年，我组合中的一些垃圾股票让我很受伤，我开始思考为什么。现在有了一个明确的结论了，失败者之所以失败是因为他们处在烂企业中。我认识到我应该作一个企业分析师，而不是股票分析师，这意味着我必须更好地理解公司本身是如何创造价值。我和经典的股票指标如ＰＥ和帐面价值保持距离，而更多地看一些企业指标如ＲＯＣ和现金流。
If one is wrong in judging a company to have a
sustainable competitive advantage, the investment results can be
disastrous.
Jean-Marie Eveillard, 5.30.08
如果一个人在判断一家公司的持久性竞争优势上犯了错误，投资结果会是灾难性的。
People suffer from an illusion of control, that
even if things do go wrong, they'll be able to sort them out. A lot
of the modern risk-management techniques created a totally false
illusion of safety. The idea that by quantifying risk using a tool
like VaR [Value at Risk] that you could therefore control it is one
of the slightly more ridiculous things to have come along in
years.
James Montier, 10.31.08
人们会因对控制的幻想而遭受痛苦，即使事情肯定已经发生了错误，他们还是能把它们挑出来。很多现代的风险管理技术创造了完全错误的安全幻想。用那些如ＶＡＲ一样的工具定量风险，然后认为因此就能控制它的这种思路是近些年有点很荒谬的事情之一。
Back in the late 1990s we invested in a few too
many “concept” stocks – earlierstage
companies with developing technologies where the
stories were compelling and indicated that there would be
considerable future value. The problem is that without a real
underpinning of asset value or earnings, these types of companies
can run into big trouble when the thesis doesn’t pan out as quickly
as expected or new competition disrupts the story.
Randall Abramson, 12.21.07
回溯到９０年代末，我们投资了很多的概念股——处于技术开发早期的公司，他们的故事引人注目，显示出巨大的未来价值。问题是，没有真正的资产和利润作为支柱，当这类主题没有按期望那样快的成功，或者新的竞争破坏了这个故事，结果这样类型的公司会陷入很大的麻烦中。
One mistake we’ve too often made is buying lagging
companies that stay that way much longer than we expect, often
because we misread a macro trend. Another thing we’ve learned from
experience is to get out when a restructuring company’s balance
sheet worsens rather than improves.
Philip Tasho, 9.28.07
我们太经常犯的一个错误就是买入落后的公司，而且持续时间比我们料想得长得多，这经常是因为我们误读了一个宏观的趋势。我们还从经历中学到了一点，就是在一家重组公司的资产负债表在变坏而不是改善时，出脱这只股票。
I’ve learned from experience to avoid
acquisition-driven stories during the actual acquisition-growth
phase – big problems always come of that. I’ve also recently
concluded that if you find yourself going back to the well with the
same idea a third time, you’re not generating enough ideas and are
likely to get killed. You’re not as vigilant as you should be
because you think you know it already. When I find myself doing
that, I tell myself I’m just not working hard enough.
Jeffrey Ubben, 1.31.06
我从经验中学到，在实际收购成长阶段，避开收购驱动的故事——大的问题通常生于其中。最近我还总结一个经验，当你为了一个同样的点子第三次回顾时，你这个点子的基础可能还不够，你可能会被灭掉。你不会象你应该警惕那样来警惕，因为你认为你已经了解了。当我发现我自己那样做时，我会告诉自己我努力得还不够。
The biggest mistakes we ever made involved a few
investments in highly acquisitive companies that had balance sheet
leverage. The big lesson is that when you mix financial risk, in
the form of leverage, with operating risk, from having to integrate
acquisitions, you compound the overall risk dramatically.
Jeffrey Tannenbaum, 7.31.07
One mistake we’ve made more than we’d like is
sticking with great niche companies
that get bored and start to make acquisitions
around the periphery. Each one of them individually doesn’t really
bother you, but then you wake up over two or three years and find
that the core business is now 40-50% of revenues instead of 80- 90%
of revenues, the new businesses are not doing so well and now the
company has too much leverage. It can catch up to you slowly, but
the cumulative effects can be devastating.
John Rogers, 11.30.05
我们犯过的一个错误是，我们坚持持有一个优秀的细分市场的公司，它觉得无聊时便开始收购外围的公司。每个被收购企业单独看也不会有什么问题，但过了两三年你醒悟后发现，主营收入占了营业收入的40-50%而不是原来的80-90%，而且新加入的公司经营得不是很好，公司的财务杠杆使用得有些过份。它就是这样慢慢地诱惑你，但累积效应是灾难性的。
[Lessons from a money-losing investment in Sprint?]
I’d put this in the category of what David Packard once said, that
more companies die of indigestion than starvation.
This was a company that had not done a big
acquisition, so our mistake was in taking the company’s plan after
the merger at face value. There were a lot of reasons, in
retrospect, to imagine they’d have a much more difficult time than
they expected.
Christopher Davis, 5.31.07
我要把David Packard从前讲的一句话放在开始：许多公司不是死于饥饿而是消化不良。
You have to be willing to double down when you
invest in the types of companies we invest in, where things often
get worse before they get better. But I don’t want to leave you
with the impression that always works. In the late 1990s I had
about a 12% portfolio position in Superior National, a big player
in California workers’ compensation insurance. I increased my
position in a rights offering and it got as high as 20% of my
portfolio. When the workers’ comp business in California fell
apart, the company turned out to be too leveraged and the shares
went from $22 to zero. The lesson wasn’t not to be aggressive, but
not to be overweighted in anything that’s so leveraged that it
really has the risk of going to zero.
Robert Robotti, 8.25.06
当你投资于我们投资的那些类公司时，你必须愿意翻倍停叫，事情在变好之前经常常是先变坏的。在90年代末，我大概12%的持仓是Superior
National，是California workers’ compensation
insurance的大玩家。在配股时我增加了我的仓位，大概占我组合的20%，当California workers’
compensation
insurance分离时，此公司暴露出过度地使用财务杠杆，股价从22变成了0。这一课教训深刻，当财务杠杆过度使用时，一定不要持仓过度，这的确有回零的风险。
One of our biggest mistakes was ten years ago going
too heavily into merging-market
closed-end funds, which were selling at 25-30%
discounts to net asset value. When the Russian debt crisis hit, the
NAVs got hammered. It’s one of the first lessons you learn: be
diversified enough that if that 1-in-100 event happens, you don’t
blow up.
Phillip Goldstein, 3.31.08
我们犯的最大的一个错误之一是十年前过度介入购并市场封闭基金，出售价格是净资产的25-30%折扣。当俄罗斯债务危机发生时，其净资产值严重受创。这是你要学的第一课：足够分散的投资，如果小概率事件发生，不会让你致命。
We have become very leery, based on experience, of
companies that need to raise capital in order to survive and
prosper. It’s not a good thing to be vulnerable to the whims of
capital markets, which can close rapidly and surprisingly.
Jeffrey Tannenbaum, 7.31.07
基于过往的经验，对于企业为了求生和繁荣进行融资，我们非常地警惕。易于受资本市场上幻想的影响可不是一件好事，那会导致关门大吉来得异常地快。
At the peak of the Internet bubble I went to an
investor presentation by [check manufacturer] Deluxe Corp., in
which they described how the Internet was going to flatter, not
tarnish the check business. Then the CEO launched into a big
discussion about how he was going to convert his core franchise to
a new platform he called Internet gift sales, and that they were
going to lose $50 million a year on it. I went away and didn’t buy
the stock, disgusted with that idea. What I learned from this,
however, was that really dumb ideas like this one actually have a
habit of meeting an early death. In fact, it turned out to be such
a dumb idea that it died quite quickly, leaving the business to
flourish under its core dynamics, unburdened by ill-considered
strategic moves. That was a big lesson.
Thomas Russo, 4.27.05
A bubble is a logical impossibility, when people
are investing on a premise that not
only won’t happen, it can’t happen. The tech bubble
in 2000 wasn’t because stock prices were high, it was because stock
prices incorporated the belief that many companies in the same
industry were all going to have 20% market shares and high margins.
That can’t happen.
Murray Stahl, 11.21.07
泡沫是不符合逻辑的。2000年的科技泡沫不是因为股价高，而是与股价相挟的信念，一个行业中的很多公司都要占有20%的市场份额和高利润率，这是不可能发生的。
One final Internet-bubble lesson is obvious, but
bears repeating: Make your own decisions. Crowds can be ugly when
they change directions.
VII, 9.28.05
It’s hard to get away from truisms and clichés, but
things that appear too good to be true – investments or otherwise –
usually are. The market exposes that from time to time and we’re in
the process of that with respect to credit right now.
Thomas Gayner, 12.21.07
Top executives from a Japanese property and
casualty insurer we’ve owned for years were just in our office last
month explaining the extent of the CDO exposure in their investment
portfolio, which was upsetting to us. We said, “Didn’t the fact
that you were buying a triple-A rated product with a yield much in
excess of what you could get from Procter & Gamble
sound too good to be true?” But that kind of thing
happened around the world.
Jean-Marie Eveillard, 5.30.08
……我们说，“你买的3A级的产品，收益率甚至超过了宝洁，这种事情听起来太好了简直不能让人相信。”但是这样的事情全球都在发生。
We were interested in Fannie Mae a year ago but
first wanted to understand their credit risk better. We spoke with
the ratings agencies and asked them what would happen if house
prices fell. “You mean a six- sigma event?” they asked. “No,” I
said,
“just if prices fell 5 or 10%.” They said, “That's
six-sigma!” Well, if house prices going back to where they had been
just 12 months earlier was considered six-sigma by the ratings
agencies, I thought we were in trouble.
Boykin Curry, 3.31.08
一年前我们对房地美有些兴趣，但首先想了解更多的信用风险。我们与评级机构通话请教他们如果房价下降会怎么样。“你说的是6-西格玛事件吗？”他们问。“不是，”我说，“我只是说房价降5-10%。”他们说，“那就是6-西格玛的事件！”好嘛，如果房价回到一年前对于评级机构就算是6-西格玛事件，我认为我们有麻烦了。
What’s most embarrassing and annoying to me is that
we foresaw credit problems for the owners of mortgage-backed
securities and CDOs backed by poor-quality mortgages, but we failed
to recognize the vulnerability of some of our companies to the
liquidity crisis that would occur as the market had its emperor's-
new-clothes moment.
Wally Weitz, 12.21.07
We’ve looked carefully at why we so often sell
investments too early. People tend to give you a pass on that,
saying you invested in the safest part of the profit cycle. But I
have to say, people have made a lot of money buying stocks from me.
Over an investment career, that’s not a good
thing. What I discovered is that the investments that have done
much better than I expected – after I sold – are consistently those
in superior businesses or with superior managements. That’s why we
now spend so much time analyzing management’s
prior actions and their results in creating shareholder value.
Ken Shubin Stein, 2.28.06
我们仔细地分析了为什么那么频繁地过早卖出投资产品。人们通常给出一个答案
你投资在了利润周期的最安全部分。但我不得不说，从我们手里买走股票的人赚了很多钱。在投资生涯中，这不是一件好事。我发现，我卖了以后，股票的走势超出我预期的都有一个一致的原因------出众的企业和出众的管理层。这就是为什么我们现在花大量的时间分析管理层的预期行为和他们创造股东价值的结果。
I’ve been fooled many times by being too impressed
by executives who are articulate
and have done well in the past. I’ve learned to be
humble about my own opinions and rely more on the opinions of
people who aren’t biased and have known the management personally
or professionally for a long time.
Ed Wachenheim, 2.29.08
我被善于表达而在过去又表现良好的管理层的愚弄印象深刻。我学会了对自己的意见更加谦卑，并且更依赖那些没有偏信、认识管理层很久或者更专业人的意见。
The lesson for investors is clear. Pay attention to
the signs of management hubris: the overly grand pronouncements,
the unwillingness to communicate, the lavish perks and pay
packages, the building of “monuments.” Ignore them at your
peril.
VII, 5.22.05
这一课对投资者是明确的。要注意管理层骄傲自大的信号：过于伟大的声明、不乐于沟通、浪费和过度支付薪水，建造“纪念碑”。忽略他们否则太冒险。
Some of my biggest investment drubbings have come
from not responding quickly to inconsistencies in what management
is saying over time or in different forums. Changing stories are a
huge red flag.
Robert Lietzow, 2.29.08
我犯的最大的几次错误就是：当管理层所说的话随着时间，或者在不同的论坛发生矛盾时，我没有快速反应。改变故事是一个巨大的危险信号。
We have at times underestimated how quickly and
deeply ineffective management
can impact a company’s operations. We typically
haven’t put a high priority on site visits and meeting with
management, but we are starting to put more emphasis on that
today.
James Vanasek, 4.30.08
我们有时会低估差劲的管理层对公司运营影响的速度和深度。显然我们没有把拜访和与管理层会谈放在首位，不过现在我们开始强调这一点了。（夕注：不尽赞同）
I’ve seen far too many businesses – investment
firms and others – run into the ground by impressive people who
start to think they’re smarter than everyone else. That’s
when big mistakes get made. There are enough ways
to screw up in this business without bringing it on yourself
because of ego.
Barry Rosenstein, 3.30.07
We shorted crude oil at $40 per barrel and
thankfully Karen [Finerman] got us to cover around $44. When prices
detach on the upside from fundamentals, the best
thing to do is to run screaming from the building.
There’s no reason a ridiculous
price can’t go to 3x ridiculous.
Jeffrey Schwarz, 5.30.08
This is not at all to say valuation doesn’t matter,
but there have been times I’ve been
right about the trend but didn’t buy a leader
because it was 20% too expensive and that turned out to be a
mistake.
John Burbank, 8.31.08
当我正确地判断和形势但却没买领袖股只是因为它贵了20%，这是一个错误。
When something spooks me, I should more often take
advantage of the liquidity of the market to get out and finish the
work on whatever the new issues are. If you determine the problem
is a big one, you can avoid a lot of pain. If you conclude the
problem is only temporary, you can typically get back in at a lower
price.
David Eigen, 1.31.06
当什么东西吓到我，我通常会利用市场的流动性先行出场。。。如果你确定问题非常严重，你会避免很多痛苦。如果你最后认为问题只是暂时的，你一般都可能以更低的价格进场。
If you believe the market can at times be
inefficient, as I do, the logical conclusion is to be wary of what
it's telling you when it says you’re wrong. That can sometimes
mean I don't cut my losses when I should.
Jeffrey Schwarz, 5.30.08
如果你像我一样，相信市场有时是无效的，那合乎逻辑的结论就是，当它说你错了的时候提防它所说的。有时这就意味着，当我应该止损的时候，我不去这么做。
The single biggest thing people do wrong is to
believe there is a single right way to
invest, like it’s handed down from God. Things
trade at different values from their
true worth because human beings look a them in
certain ways in certain circumstances. Those ways and circumstances
can change, so the tools you use and your thought processes have to
evolve. The same thing doesn’t work over and over again – the
market’s too smart for that.
Lisa Rapuano, 9.28.05
人们做的最错误的一件事是相信有一种正确的投资方法，就像上天赐予的一样。标的物以与其价值不同的价格进行交易，是因为人们在不同的条件下用不同的方式来看待它。那些条件和方式能够变化，所以你使用的工具和你的思想也需要进化。同样的事情不会反反复复地有效------市场会因此而大吃苦头。
Mistakes of judgment are the toughest to learn
from, because each one is different.
There were a lot of ways to look at the mistake of
buying AT&T when Michael
Armstrong took over, for example, that would have
prevented you from buying
IBM when Lou Gerstner came in.
Christopher Davis, 5.31.07
错误是判断是最难从中吸取教训的，因为每次都是不同的。当Michael
Armstrong收购AT&T时，从很多方面都可以考虑到买入AT&T是错误的，但这种教训会妨碍你在Lou
Gerstner进入IBM时买入IBM。
When I worked for New York City, I met an old-time
surveyor in my department
who had gone broke betting on horses. The first
time he had gone to the racetrack
he decided to bet on a horse named Surveyor, and
the worst possible thing happened – the horse won. This guy figured
it was easy money and over the next 20 years he proceeded to lose
just about everything he had.
Phillip Goldstein, 3.31.08
我在为New York
City工作时，我在我的部门遇到一个老资格的总监，他曾经因赌马而破产。他第一次在赛马场时决定压注在一匹名字叫总监的马上，同时最坏的事情发生了------这匹马赢了。这个家伙认为这样赚钱很容易，在接下来20年里，他几乎输掉了自己所有的东西。
One lesson borne of experience is that the best
course in investing is often to do
nothing. That’s a hard lesson to apply in practice,
given the propensity most of us
have for tinkering.
Edward Studzinski, 4.30.08
实践中的一个教训就是，投资最好的过程是经常什么也不做。但实际应用起来却很难，我们大多数人都倾向于无事瞎忙。
Is investing a creative process? Hard charging
money managers resist defining
what they do in terms usually reserved for artists.
But if one defines a creative person
– as does the American Heritage
dictionary
– as “one who displays productive originality,”
there’s little doubt that successful investors fit the mold. To be
sure, creativity isn’t possible without perseverance, effort and,
of course, the right attitude. Edison went through more than 9,000
experiments in his quest to create the incandescent light bulb.
When derided by colleagues for what they perceived to be the
foolish quest, he responded: “I haven’t even failed once; 9,000
times I’ve learned what doesn’t work.”
VII, 10.28.05
If you never make a mistake, you’re being too
conservative and missing profit
opportunities you shouldn’t.
Ed Wachenheim, 2.29.08
如果你从未犯过错，你可能是太保守了，会失去很多盈利的机会。
Don’t be paralyzed by the fear of making a mistake.
Understand that the best
opportunities usually carry more perceived risks,
and distinguish carefully between the risks that matter most and
those you can live with. As long as I know the risks I’m taking and
the stock prices are compensating me to take those risks, I can
live with that.
Brian Gaines, 5.26.06
不要让怕犯错误影响你的行动。要理解，最好的机会都带有风险。要仔细辨别这风险是致命的还是你能够忍受的。只要我了解了我所要冒的风险，股价会对此做出补偿，我就能忍受这样的风险。
I’ve been doing this for more than 25 years and
have learned never to take mistakes lightly. What’s most important
for us, though, is to stay focused on the discipline of only
investing in companies with the characteristics of leaders,
laggards and innovators that we’ve seen work as investments over a
long period of time. That discipline keeps us grounded, and helps
us keep mistakes in perspective. Otherwise, you can drive yourself
crazy.
Philip Tasho, 9.28.07
这一行我干了25年，轻松地学会了不要犯错误。对我们来说，最重要的是，严格地遵守纪律，只投资于那些具影响力、股价落后和具革新特性的公司，而且在我们投资后会保持很长一段时间。这样的自律让我们脚踏实地，让我们对失误有洞察力。否则，你会让你自己发疯的。
We're quite open and honest about our mistakes, but
we have to be very careful not to take the experiences of the last
year as justification for fundamentally changing how we analyze and
select stocks. Our common belief is that this is a very unique
environment that we probably won't see again for some time once we
get through it. It's important to keep that in mind, or you may
find yourself changing how you do things at exactly the wrong
time.
Connor Browne, 10.31.08
我们对自己的错误既开放又诚恳，但必须极为小心，我们在如何分析和选择股票时，不能用上一年的经验来判断。我们的基本信念是：这是非常独特的环境，一旦我们经历了以后，在很长一段时间都不会遇到了。记住这一点非常重要，否则你会发现你所做的事情是在一个错误的时间框架下。
The best advice is to learn from mistakes and move
on. “If every shot you hit in golf was a hole-in-one, you’d lose
interest,” Warren Buffett has said. “You gotta hit a few in the
woods.”
VII, 4.27.05
最好的忠告就是从错误中学习，然后继续前行。“如果你打高尔夫的每一击都是一杆进洞，你就会失去兴趣。”巴菲特说。“你应该在林中多打几杆。”
投资智慧（序）——风格不同价值投资者的共同特性
投资智慧（1）——“有效”市场
投资智慧（2）——时间跨度
投资智慧（3）——能力圈和流通盘大小要紧吗？
投资智慧（4）——对行业的理解
投资智慧（5）——价值在哪里？
投资智慧（6）——价值在哪里？
投资智慧（7）——点子的产生
投资智慧（8）——研究过程
投资智慧（9）——分析的严格
投资智慧（10）——管理教育
投资智慧（11）——定义价值
投资智慧（12）——主动管理
投资智慧（13）——买入和卖出
投资智慧（14）——集中还是分散？
投资智慧（15）——管理风险
投资智慧（16）——关于现金
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发表于 2011-10-15 23:04:11
